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R463DispatchesAnimal Behaviour: Emotion in Invertebrates?Bees exposed to vigorous shaking designed to simulate a dangerous event
judge ambiguous stimuli as predicting a negative outcome — a ‘pessimistic’
cognitive bias that is characteristic of anxious or depressed humans and other
vertebrates in putative negative emotional states.Figure 1. High anxiety for a bee?
Insects are often viewed as simple reflex
machines, but new research on the honeybee
shows that their decisions in ambiguous situ-
ations appear to be state-dependent — they
interpret ambiguous stimuli more negatively
following experience of an aversive event.
Depressedor anxiouspeople, andother verte-
brates in putatively negative affective states,
also interpret ambiguous stimuli pessimisti-
cally, raising the possibility that bees, like
these other species, possess affective states
that help guide decision-making. However,
whether these states are consciously experi-
enced remains an open question.Michael Mendl1, Elizabeth S. Paul1,
and Lars Chittka2
Do non-human animals have
emotions? If so, how can we measure
them? And why should we be
interested? Society’s concerns about
animal welfare are rooted in the
assumption that animals can
experience negative sensations
and emotions, and hence suffer.
Furthermore, the development of
therapeutic psychoactive drugs
continues to rely on animal models of
emotion. Clearly, there are pragmatic
and societally important reasons for
studying emotional states in animals.
But how can such states be
measured? At present, we cannot
measure the conscious experience of
emotion — the feeling of anxiety or
happiness— inother species.However,
contemporary research conceptualizes
emotions as comprising not just
a conscious component, but also
behavioural, neurophysiological and
cognitive components [1,2]. Changes
in these latter three components can
be measured objectively, may correlate
with verbal report of conscious
emotions in people and, therefore,
may be useful proxy indicators of
such states.
Recently there has been
considerable interest in the possibility
that the decisions animals make in
ambiguous situations reliably reflect
the valence (positivity or negativity)
of their emotional (affective) state [3,4].
As in depressed or anxious humans,
animals in putative negative affective
states are more likely to make negative
(‘pessimistic’) judgments about
ambiguous stimuli than those in
positive states [4]. These ‘cognitive
biases’ may thus be useful measures of
animal affect. So far, published studies
have been of mammals and birds only
(for example, [5–9]). In this issue of
Current Biology, however, Bateson
and colleagues [10] provide the firstevidence that a similar relationship
between putative affective state and
cognitive bias exists in an invertebrate
species, the honeybee, raising
interesting questions about the
interpretation of such studies, and
their implications for invertebrate
‘emotion’ (Figure 1).
To measure cognitive biases,
Bateson et al. [10] adapted a paradigm
(Figure 2) initially developed for
studying rats [5]. Honeybees were
trainedonadiscrimination task inwhich
one combination of two odours in a 1:9
ratio was presented with a rewarding
sucrose solution, while another
combination of the odours in a 9:1 ratio
was presented with a less rewarding
(more dilute) sucrose solution or, in
separate experiments, an aversive
(punishing) quinine solution [11].
In just 12 training trials, many of the
bees learnt to extend their probosces
to the 1:9 odour combination in order
to drink the associated reward, and to
withhold their probosces when the
9:1 odour combination was presented
to avoid the punishing or less rewarding
outcome.
The next stage of the experiment
allowed investigation of cognitive
biases by presenting ambiguous odour
cues which were intermediate between
the two trained odour combinations
(odour ratios of 3:7, 1:1, 7:3). Bees
responding to these ambiguous stimuli
by extending their probosces (in
anticipation of a sucrose reward) could
be categorized as showing a more
‘optimistic’ response than those that
did not. Before bees were tested,
half were subjected to one minute
of vigorous shaking to simulate
a dangerous event such as a predatory
attack on the hive, and to induce
something akin to a negative affective
state through exposure to this naturally
aversive stimulus. The shaking caused
decreases in dopamine, octopamine
and serotonin, all of which function as
hormones as well as neurotransmittersinvolved in learning and memory in
insects, thus suggesting a potential
mechanism to link state-related
changes and decision-making [10].
The hypothesis that bees in this
shaken state would show a more
‘pessimistic’ response to ambiguous
odour cues than non-shaken bees was
supported. They were less likely to
extend their probosces to the trained
9:1 odour combination predicting
punishment, and to the most similar
ambiguous 7:3 odour combination.
A lack of differences between the
treatment groups in their responses to
the 1:9 odour combination predicting
reward indicates that the findings
were not simply the result of shaking
inhibiting subsequent proboscis
extension, or decreasing general
activity. The predicted cognitive bias
was observed in three separate
experiments using different
combinations of sucrose rewards
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Figure 2. A generic method for testing affect-induced cognitive bias in decision-making under
ambiguity.
Training phase: the subject is trained to make one response (P) to a CS+ cue predicting a posi-
tive outcome (e.g. palatable food) in order to obtain that outcome, and a different response (N)
to a CS- cue (in the same sensory dimension as CS+) to avoid a negative outcome. Affect
manipulation: once trained, the subject is exposed to a short- or long-term treatment designed
to induce a relatively positive or negative affective state (e.g. exposure to an aversive event or
environment). Testing phase: the subject is presented with CS+, CS-, and ambiguous cues
with sensory properties that are intermediate between CS+ and CS-, to test the hypothesis
that individuals in a putatively negative affective state are more likely to make response N
to these cues — indicating a ‘pessimistic’ cognitive bias — than individuals in a relatively posi-
tive state. (See [5].)
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confirming a robust effect of the
shaking treatment.
The effects are as clear as those
from comparable vertebrate studies
(for example, [5–9]), and remind us to
be cautious about assuming that the
cognitive processes of bigger-brained
animals are necessarily richer or
more sophisticated than those
of smaller-brained ones [12].
Modulation of decision-making by
affective state may occur in bees, as
in humans and other vertebrates. The
neurophysiological mechanisms are
likely to be different, but the resultant
decision-making behaviour looks
strikingly similar.
Does this mean, then, that bees have
emotional states, in the sense of
conscious experiences of feelings?
This question is as hard to answer as
it is for vertebrate animals [13]. Indeed,
the inference of conscious experience
of emotions from observed behaviour
is problematic even in humans [14].
Pain, unlike basic nociception, isa sensory and emotional experience
that is consciously perceived. Yet
symptoms typically associated with
pain (withdrawal reflexes, grimacing,
surges in stress hormones levels) occur
even in anaesthetized humans under
surgery, brain-dead patients, and
anencephalic babies [15]. In animals,
we must be even more cautious about
deducing conscious emotional states
from overt behaviour [16]. For example,
in the 18th century, the honeybee dance
was interpreted as an expression of
‘joy’, exhibited by bees that had
discovered a particularly rich foraging
bonanza [17]. If one defines happiness
by behavioural criteria such as
exuberant movement patterns
following a rewarding experience, then
one might indeed classify the waggle
dance in this fashion. However, such an
interpretation clearly misses the actual
function of the honeybee dance, to
communicate the precise coordinates
of a food source.
It is, of course, legitimate to label
behaviour patterns as equivalent tothose associated with certain emotions
in humans, and to consider their
adaptive benefits. Consider
aggression — the question of whether
bees can be aggressive is quite apart
from whether they consciously ‘feel
angry’. We can analyse the behavioural
features, adaptive significance,
physiology and genetics of aggression
without implicating experiential
components. In this vein, it is
interesting to contemplate the adaptive
function of the cognitive bias that
Bateson et al. [10] have discovered in
bees. Their findings raise the possibility
that, perhaps like other species, bees
possess a system that tracks their
experiences of rewarding and
punishing events in the environment,
influencing the decisions that they
make in an adaptive way [18]. A
positively valenced state, resulting
from experience of a generally
rewarding environment, may act to bias
judgement of an ambiguous stimulus
as being more likely to herald
a rewarding rather than a punishing
event, whilst a negatively valenced
state, resulting from experience of
a punishing or dangerous environment,
should favour the opposite judgement
to avoid the higher probability of an
unfavourable outcome. This (affective)
state may thus act as a cumulative
measure of experience in the
environment — a proxy Bayesian
prior — to aid decision-making,
and be manifest by various neural
mechanisms, perhaps as a result of
convergent evolution, across diverse
taxa. Bateson et al. [10] provide a first
indication that the interface between
such states and decision-making has
similarities across vertebrate and
invertebrate taxa, and raise fascinating
questions about the processes that
underlie ambiguous judgements.
Biased decision-making under
ambiguity may thus reliably reflect the
valence of an animal’s affective state,
but the question of whether (and which)
animals have an actual awareness of
such states (conscious emotions)
remains open. It might be possible to
address this question by borrowing
conceptual tools from, for example, the
study of metacognition— research into
the question of whether animals know
what they know [19]. Useful information
might also emerge from a comparative
exploration of what the adaptive
benefits of such an awareness might
be for a variety of animal species
in their natural environment.
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Bacterial ChemotaxisTemperature changes affect reaction kinetics. How do signaling pathways
cope with such global perturbation? A recent study dissects the solution found
by bacterial chemotaxis.Yann S. Dufour, Michael W. Sneddon,
and Thierry Emonet*
Biological systems living in complex
environments must perform well
across a wide range of environmental
conditions. Therefore, signaling
pathways and regulatory networks
controlling cellular functions are
expected to operate in the presence of
environmental perturbations [1].
Temperature fluctuations in the cellular
environment affect the rate of all
chemical reactions in a cell. How cells
remain functional in the face of such
global perturbations remains relatively
unexplored. A recent study published
in Cell by Oleksiuk et al. [2] takes us
a step closer to understanding the
molecular mechanisms used by
signaling pathways to cope with
temperature change. Using the
Escherichia coli chemotaxis pathway
as model system [3], the authors
present a comprehensive picture of the
various strategies evolved by this
system to compensate for the effect
of temperature change on two keyfunctional parameters: the steady state
of the system output and the rate of
adaptation to a constant stimulus.
Like many flagellated bacterial
species, E. coli biases its random walk
(runs and tumbles) toward favorable
conditions by making temporal
comparisons of environmental signals
and by suppressing changes in
swimming direction accordingly [3].
The basic functional ingredients
necessary to swim up a signal gradient
are high sensitivity to stimuli and the
capability to adapt to constant
stimulus. In both regards, bacterial
populationsofE. coliperformextremely
well, operating close to the theoretical
limit of sensitivity [4] while exhibiting
nearly perfect adaption over five
orders of magnitude in signal intensity
[5,6]. High sensitivity is achieved
through the cooperative activity of
receptors that form clusters in the cell
membrane [7,8], and adaptation results
from the slow methylation or
demethylation of these receptors by
the antagonistic enzymes CheR and
CheB, respectively (Figure 1A). Theactivity of the receptors is transmitted
to the flagellar motors through
a phosphorylation cascade initiated by
the receptor-bound histidine kinase
CheA and relayed by the cytoplasmic
response-regulator CheY. The
switching rate of the flagellar motors,
which determines the mean run length,
is ultra-sensitive to the level of the
phosphorylated form of CheY (CheY-P)
[9]. CheY-P steady-state levels are
maintained in the sensitive range of
the motor by the basal level of CheA
kinase activity and constitutive
dephosphorylation by the phosphatase
CheZ. Despite its simplicity, the
bacterial chemotaxis pathway exhibits
rich functions and continues to reveal
remarkable properties of biological
pathways to researchers.
Probing how E. coli chemotaxis
might be affected by temperature
variation represents a significant
technical challenge. Thanks to current
theoretical understanding of the
behavior of the pathway and a clever
use of genetic backgrounds, Oleksiuk
et al. [2] were able to monitor the
activities of different components of
the system in vivo. Taking advantage
of the rapid kinetics of the
phosphorylation cascade, they
monitored the Fo¨rster resonance
energy transfer (FRET) between
CheY-P and CheZ, both labeled with
fluorescent proteins, as a readout of
the kinase activity [8]. Using ordinary
